Learning Your Earning: Are Labor Income Shocks Really Very Persistent? by Fatih Guvenen
Learning Your Earning:
Are Labor Income Shocks Really Very Persistent?
July 3, 2005
Abstract
T h ec u r r e n tl i t e r a t u r eo ﬀers two views on the nature of the income process. According to
the ﬁrst view, which we call the “restricted income proﬁles” (RIP) model (MaCurdy, 1982),
individuals are subject to large and very persistent shocks, while facing similar life-cycle income
proﬁles (conditional on a few characteristics). According to the alternative view, which we call the
“heterogeneous income proﬁles” (HIP) model (Lillard and Weiss, 1979), individuals are subject
to income shocks with modest persistence, while facing individual-speciﬁci n c o m ep r o ﬁles. While
labor income data does not seem to distinguish between the two hypotheses in a deﬁnitive way, the
RIP model is overwhelmingly used to specify the income process in economic models, because it
delivers implications consistent with certain features of consumption data. In this paper we study
the consumption-savings behavior under the HIP model, which so far has not been investigated.
In a life-cycle model, we assume that individuals enter the labor market with a prior belief
about their individual-speciﬁcp r o ﬁle and learn over time in a Bayesian fashion. We ﬁnd that
learning is slow, and thus initial uncertainty aﬀects decisions throughout the life-cycle allowing
us to estimate the prior uncertainty from consumption behavior later in life. This procedure
implies that 40 percent of variation in income growth rates is forecastable by individuals at time
zero. The resulting model is consistent with several features of consumption data including (i)
the substantial rise in within-cohort consumption inequality (Deaton and Paxson 1994), (ii) the
non-concave shape of the age-inequality proﬁle (which the RIP model is not consistent with), and
(iii) the fact that consumption proﬁles are steeper for higher educated individuals (Carroll and
Summers 1991). These results bring new evidence from consumption data on the nature of labor
income risk.
Keywords: Labor income risk, Incomplete markets, Inequality, Consumption-savings
decision, Kalman ﬁlter.
JEL classiﬁcation: D52, D91, E21
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
When markets are incomplete, labor income risk plays a central role in many decisions that individu-
als make. Understanding the nature of income risk is thus an essential prerequisite for understanding
a wide range of economic questions, such as the determination of wealth inequality (Aiyagari (1994)),
the eﬀectiveness of self-insurance (Deaton (1991)), the welfare costs of business cycles (Lucas (2003),
and the determination of asset prices (Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996)), among others.
The current literature oﬀers two views on the nature of the income process. According to the
ﬁrst view, which we call the “restricted income proﬁles” (RIP) model, individuals are subject to
large and very persistent shocks, while facing similar life-cycle income proﬁles (that only vary across
the population with a few observable characteristics). According to the alternative view, which
we call the “heterogeneous income proﬁles” (HIP) model, individuals are subject to shocks with
modest persistence, while facing life-cycle proﬁles that are individual-speciﬁc( a n dt y p i c a l l yv a r y
signiﬁcantly across the population). As we discuss below, while labor income data arguably provides
more support for the second view, it does not seem to distinguish between the two hypotheses in
ad e ﬁnitive way. The goal of this paper is to use the restrictions imposed on consumption data by
these income processes to distinguish between the two hypotheses.
It is useful to begin with a brief discussion of the empirical evidence from labor income data. For
concreteness, suppose that the log income of individual i with t years of labor market experience is
given by:1
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where βi is the individual-speciﬁci n c o m eg r o w t hr a t ew i t hc r o s s - s e c t i o n a lv a r i a n c eσ2
β;a n dηi
t is the
innovation to the AR(1) process.
The early papers on income dynamics estimated (versions of) the income process given in (1)
without imposing any restrictions on its parameters (Hause (1980); Lillard and Weiss (1979)). These






, and (ii) the persistence of income shocks to be signiﬁcantly less than a random
walk (0.5 <ρ<0.8). As noted above, these two features deﬁne the HIP model. The human capital
model (Becker (1965), Ben-Porath (1967)) implies heterogeneity in income proﬁles, for example, if
individuals diﬀer in their ability level, providing one theoretical motivation for the HIP model.
In an inﬂuential paper, MaCurdy (1982) cast doubt on these ﬁndings. He tested the simple
proposition that if individuals diﬀered systematically in their income growth rates as the HIP model
1This income process is a substantially simpliﬁed version of the models estimated in the literature, but still captures
the components necessary for the present discussion.
2suggests, then income changes should be positively autocorrelated. Instead, he found them to be
close to zero, and in fact, slightly negative. Subsequent work by Abowd and Card (1989), Topel
(1990) and Topel and Ward (1992) tested the same implication using various longer panel data
sets only to conﬁrm MaCurdy’s conclusion. Based on this work, most of the following literature
estimated versions of the income process (1), but now imposing σ2
β ≡ 0 (the RIP model), and with
this restriction, found the persistence of income shocks to be extremely high (ρ>0.95;a m o n g
others, Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994), Moﬃtt and Gottschalk (1995), and Storesletten et al.
(2004)). Finally, more recently some authors have extended the analysis of the early HIP literature
using more representative panel data sets and richer econometric speciﬁcations, and conﬁrmed the
results of this early literature (Baker (1997), Haider (2001) and Guvenen (2005)).2
Although taken together, the described empirical evidence does not indicate an overwhelming
support for the RIP model (and could be interpreted as the opposite), this speciﬁcation is over-
whelmingly used as the income process in economic models. Perhaps an important reason for this
preference is that the consumption-savings behavior generated in response to the RIP model is con-
sistent with important empirical facts. For example, Deaton and Paxson (1994) have documented
the signiﬁcant rise in within-cohort consumption inequality over the life-cycle. As conjectured by
these authors (and later veriﬁed by Storesletten et al. (2003)) a life-cycle model is consistent with
this observation if idiosyncratic shocks are extremely persistent. Summarizing the existing empirical
evidence, Lucas (2003) states:
The fanning out over time of the earnings and consumption distributions within a
cohort that Angus Deaton and [Christina] Paxson (1994) document is striking evidence
of a sizeable, uninsurable random walk component in earnings.
A second empirical observation, documented by Carroll and Summers (1991), is that the average
life-cycle consumption proﬁle is hump-shaped: it rises and falls together with labor income over the
life-cycle. Again, a life-cycle model can generate this pattern if income shocks are very persistent,
as implied by the RIP model (Carroll (1992) and Attanasio et al. (1999)).
These plausible implications of the RIP model for the consumption-savings behavior–together
w i t ht h ef a c tt h a tt h eﬁt of the RIP model to labor income data is not dramatically worse than that
of the HIP model–have made the former the preferred income process in economic analysis. Perhaps
surprisingly though, there exists no corresponding study of the consumption-savings behavior when
t h ei n c o m ep r o c e s si st h eH I Pm o d e l ,s ot h ei m p l i cations of such a model for consumption data are
largely unknown.3 The goal of this paper is to ﬁll this gap.
2It is then curious that the conclusion reached by MaCurdy’s test seems to contradict this direct estimation evidence.
Baker (1997) and Guvenen (2005) argue that the HIP model is in fact consistent with MaCurdy’s results.
3Nevertheless, there has been some suggestion in the literature that the implications of the HIP model are not
3To this end, we study the consumption-savings behavior in a life-cycle model with the HIP
process. Because individuals aree xa n t eh e t e r o g e n e o u si nt h eH I Pm o d e l ,ak e yq u e s t i o ni sh o w
much individuals know about their own proﬁle. Rather than imposing a certain amount of knowledge,
we assume that individuals enter the labor market with some uncertainty about their income proﬁle,
and we infer the amount of this prior uncertainty from consumption data as described below. More
speciﬁcally, we assume that individuals form a prior belief over βi and αi (the intercept of the
income proﬁle), which is updated in a Bayesian fashion with subsequent income realizations. We
cast the optimal learning process as a Kalman ﬁltering problem, which allows us to conveniently
obtain recursive formulas for updating beliefs. In a related model, Wang (2004) obtains closed-form
solutions for optimal consumption choice when individuals cannot distinguish between two separate
persistent shocks. However, he abstracts from learning about proﬁles.
It is often the case with Bayesian learning that most of the uncertainty is resolved quickly,
sometimes with a handful of observations. Instead, in the present framework learning turns out to
be very gradual and its eﬀects on consumption behavior extend throughout the life-cycle. The key
feature of our model responsible for this result is the presence of learning about the growth rate of
income. As we show in Section 2.4, Bayesian learning about a trend parameter (βi)h a sf e a t u r e s
that are inherently diﬀerent (and for our purposes more appealing) than the more standard learning
about a level parameter (such as αi).
We next compare the model to the U.S. consumption data. As a ﬁr s ts t e p ,w es h o wt h a ti f
individuals have no private information about their own proﬁle (i.e., the prior variances of αi and βi
equal the population variances), then the cross-sectional variance of log income increases by about
40 log-points over the life-cycle, signiﬁcantly exceeding the roughly 25 log-points rise in the U.S.
data. Thus the HIP model is capable of generating substantial rise in consumption inequality. One
way to estimate the prior variance of βi is then to choose it such that the model generates a 25
log-points increase in inequality. This procedure yields a prior variance of βi equal to 0.6 × σ2
β.
The interpretation is that the remaining 40 percent of the variability in income growth rates in the
population is forecastable by individuals by the time they enter the labor market.
Second, the empirical age-inequality proﬁle of consumption has a non-concave shape. This fact
has been emphasized by Deaton and Paxson (1994) and Storesletten et al. (2003) because the RIP
model gives rise to a concave shape. The HIP model instead implies a non-concave age-inequality
proﬁle–that results from learning about βi, as we show in Section 4.2–which also provides a fairly
good ﬁt to its empirical counterpart.
likely to be consistent with certain consumption facts. For example, Storesletten et al. (2001) state: “Should in-
creasing income inequality be attributable to heterogeneity which is deterministic across households, many models of
consumption choice predict that consumption inequality will not increase with age (p. 416).”
4Third, Carroll and Summers (1991) also document that college graduates not only have steeper
income proﬁles than high-school graduates but also have steeper consumption proﬁles. In the RIP
model, the estimated persistence and innovation variance of income shocks are similar for diﬀerent
education groups (Hubbard et al. (1994), Carroll and Samwick (1997)), resulting in consumption
proﬁles with similar slopes for both groups. On the other hand, when HIP is introduced, we ﬁnd that
the estimated dispersion of βi among college graduates is more than twice that among high-school
graduates (Table 1). This larger dispersion generates more precautionary savings and consequently
a steeper consumption proﬁle for college-graduates (unless these individuals are able to predict a
much larger fraction of this dispersion compared to high-school graduates). These last two examples
underscore the diﬀerences between the nature of labor income risk implied by the RIP model and
the HIP model with Bayesian learning.
Finally, we show that assuming a HIP process without the uncertainty and learning about βi
yields a number of counterfactual implications for the consumption-savings behavior. Furthermore,
if heterogeneity is introduced through a larger dispersion in αi, (instead of the dispersion in βi),
more than 80 percent of this uncertainty is resolved in the ﬁrst three years of an individual’s life,
leaving little role for further learning. Thus, learning about income growth is an essential element
in this model.
As noted earlier, to our knowledge there is no previous work on the consumption-savings behavior
when the income process is the HIP model. The closest work is Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2004)
who study a human capital model with ability heterogeneity and consider idiosyncratic shocks to
the human capital accumulation function. They ﬁnd diﬀerences in income growth rates (induced
by ability heterogeneity) to be a key element in explaining the moments of the cross-sectional dis-
tribution of income and consumption. The diﬀerence is that in their framework, individuals know
their own ability (and hence their average income growth rate), so there is no learning over time.
In addition, they focus on the ability of the model to explain labor income data and study only
a subset of consumption facts examined in the present paper. In a diﬀerent context, Cunha et
al. (2005) study students’ schooling choice, in a complete markets setting, to infer the amount of
earnings variability that is forecastable by the time students decide to go to college. They estimate
that about 60 percent of variability in returns to schooling is forecastable. Navarro (2004) extends
this analysis by introducing credit constraints and consumption choice, and ﬁnds that a signiﬁcant
fraction of schooling returns remain forecastable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the RIP and
HIP models and examine the properties of Bayesian learning about proﬁles in the latter model. In
Section 3 we present a life-cycle model of consumption-savings with optimal learning. In Section
4, we present the quantitative results of the model. Section 5 discusses possible extensions and
applications of the model and presents conclusions.
52 Bayesian Learning About Income Proﬁles
We ﬁrst specify the RIP and HIP models and discuss the speciﬁc parameterizations we use. Sec-
ond, because individuals are ex ante heterogeneous in the HIP model a key question is how much
individuals know, and how they learn, about their individual-speciﬁci n c o m ep r o ﬁles. Thus, we
investigate the properties of optimal learning in this environment. The main result of this section
is that learning about income growth rate (or a “trend variable” in general) has some interesting
features not present when individuals learn about the level of income (or a “stationary variable” in
general). This distinction is crucial and plays a central role in the determination of consumption
and savings over the life-cycle.
2.1 Two stochastic processes for labor earnings
We ﬁrst introduce the two income processes. The general process for log earnings, e yi
t, of individual




















where the functions g and f denote two separate “life-cycle” components of earnings. The ﬁrst
function captures the part of variation that is common to all individuals (hence the coeﬃcient
vector θ0 is not individual-speciﬁc) and is assumed to be a quartic polynomial in experience, t.4
The second function, f, is the centerpiece of our analysis, and captures the component of life-
cycle earnings that is individual- or group-speciﬁc. For example, if the growth rate of earnings varies
with the ability of a worker, or is diﬀerent across occupations, this variation will be reﬂected in an
individual- or occupation-speciﬁcs l o p ec o e ﬃcient in f. In the baseline case, we assume this function









across individuals with zero mean, variances of σ2
α and σ2
β, and covariance of σαβ.5
The stochastic component of income is modeled as an AR(1) process plus a purely transitory
shock. This speciﬁcation is fairly common in the literature and, despite its parsimonious structure,
4While it is also possible to include an education dummy into g, we do not pursue this strategy in the baseline
speciﬁcation. Later in the paper, we will allow for a separate income process for each education group to fully control
for the eﬀect of education on the life-cycle proﬁl e sa sw e l la si t se ﬀect on the persistence and variance of income shocks.
5The zero-mean assumption is a normalization since g already includes an intercept and a linear term. Moreover,
although it is straightforward to generalize f to allow for heterogeneity in higher order terms, Baker (1997, p. 373)
ﬁnds that this extension does not noticeably aﬀect parameter estimates or improve the ﬁt of the model. In addition,
each term introduced into this component will appear as an additional state variable in the dynamic programming
problem we solve later. In the baseline case, that problem already has ﬁve continuous state variables and certain
non-standard features described in the computational appendix, so we prefer to avoid any further complexity. Lillard
and Reville (1999) on the other hand, provide some evidence suggesting that the quadratic term may be important,
so this seems to be an extension worth considering in future work.
6it appears to provide a good description of income dynamics in the data (Topel (1990), Hubbard et
al. (1994), Moﬃtt and Gottschalk (1995), Storesletten et al. (2004)).6 The innovations ηi
t and εi
t
are assumed to be independent of each other and over time (and independent of αi and βi), with
zero mean, and variances of σ2
η and σ2
ε respectively.
The RIP and HIP models are distinguished by their assumptions about f. The HIP model refers
to the general (unrestricted) process given in equation (2). The RIP model, on the other hand, refers
to the same process estimated with the restriction βi ≡ 0 imposed.
To calibrate the model that we present in the next section, we use the parameter values displayed
in table 1 taken from Guvenen (2005). The ﬁrst two rows display the estimates for the whole
population from the RIP and HIP models respectively. The HIP model implies a signiﬁcantly lower
persistence for the AR(1) process (0.82 compared to 0.988) and a statistically (and as shown below,
quantitatively) signiﬁcant heterogeneity in income growth rates (σ2
β =0 .00038 with a t-value of 4.9).
For comparison, table 5 in Appendix A presents the estimates from the HIP model obtained in the
previous literature. Overall, the parameter values we use are consistent with this earlier work with
one exception: the variance of the ﬁxed eﬀect, σ2
α, is much smaller in our estimates (0.02 compared
to 0.14 in Baker (1997) and 0.29 in Haider (2001). In Section 2.4 we show that using a value of
0.2 would have no appreciable eﬀect on our results. Finally, the subsequent rows of table 1 display
the parameter estimates for college-educated and high school-educated individuals that is used in
Section 4.3. To our knowledge, the parameter estimates of the HIP model for each education group
is only available in Guvenen (2005).
2.2 Quantifying the heterogeneity in income proﬁles
W h i l et h ep o i n te s t i m a t eo fσ2
β of 0.00038 may appear small, this value implies substantial hetero-
geneity in income growth rates. To see this, we ﬁrst deﬁne the income residual, yi
t ≡ e yi
t − g,a n d




















The ﬁrst parenthesis contains terms that do not depend on age (i.e., the intercept of the age-
inequality proﬁle). The second parenthesis captures the rise in inequality due to the accumulated
eﬀect of the autoregressive shock. Finally, the last parenthesis contains two terms that vary with
6Alternatively, it is possible to use an unrestricted ARMA (1,1) or (1,2) process (MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and
Card (1989), Moﬃtt and Gottschalk (1995)). Although this speciﬁcation provides more ﬂexibility, it also introduces
additional parameters that appear as state variables in dynamic decision problems (as the one we study in Section 3)
expanding the state space. Consequently, economic models that use individual income processes as inputs typically
opt for more parsimonious speciﬁcations similar to the one used here.
7age, which are due to proﬁle heterogeneity: a decreasing linear term in t (since σαβ < 0), and more
importantly, a quadratic term in t. It is easy to see that even when σ2
β is very small, the eﬀect
of proﬁle heterogeneity on income inequality will grow rapidly with t2, as the cohort gets older.
Table 2 illustrates this point by displaying the value of terms in each parenthesis over the life-cycle.
As can be seen in column 4, the contribution of proﬁle heterogeneity to income inequality is very
small early in the life-cycle. In fact, up to age 47 more than half of the cross-sectional variance
of income is generated by the ﬁxed eﬀect, and the transitory and persistent shocks. The eﬀect of
proﬁle heterogeneity continues to rise however, and accounts for almost 80 percent of inequality at
retirement age.
2.3 The Kalman Filtering Problem
The key feature of the HIP model is that individuals are ex ante diﬀerent in their income proﬁles,
which–as the analysis above illustrates–accounts f o ral a r g ef r a c t i o no ft h er i s ei nw i t h i n - c o h o r t
income inequality. Hence, to embed the estimated income process into a life-cycle model, we need
to be speciﬁc about what the individual knows about
¡
αi,βi¢
. A plausible scenario is one in which
an individual enters the labor market with some prior belief about his income growth prospects.
This prior could incorporate some relevant information unavailable to the econometrician as we
discuss below. Over time, a rational individual will reﬁne these initial beliefs by incorporating the
information revealed by successive income realizations. We assume that this updating (“learning”)
process is carried out in an optimal (Bayesian) fashion.
In order to formally deﬁne the learning problem we need to specify which components of income





would be revealed in just two periods, leaving no role for further learning.
Although we could allow either zt or εt to be separately observable and still have non-trivial learning,
it seems diﬃcult to make a compelling case for why one component would be observable while the
other is not. Thus as a benchmark case, we assume that individuals only observe total income, yi
t,
and not its components separately.
It is convenient to express the learning process as a Kalman ﬁltering problem using the state-
space representation. In this framework, the “state equation” describes the evolution of the vector












































7Vectors and matrices are denoted by bold letters throughout the paper.
8Even though the parameters of the income proﬁle have no dynamics, including them into the state
vector yields recursive updating formulas for beliefs using the Kalman ﬁlter. A second (observation)
equation expresses the observable variable(s) in the model–in this case, log income–as a linear




















We assume that both shocks have i.i.d Normal distributions and are independent of each other,
with Q and R denoting the covariance matrix of νi
t and the variance of εi
t respectively.8 To capture
an individual’s initial uncertainty, we model his prior belief over (αi,βi,zi
1) by a multivariate Normal
distribution with mean b Si


















w h e r ew eu s et h es h o r t - h a n dn o t a t i o nσ2









individual’s belief about the unobserved vector Si
t has a normal posterior distribution with a mean
vector b Si
t|t, and covariance matrix Pt|t. Similarly, let b Si
t+1|t and Pt+1|t denote the one-period-ahead
forecasts of these two variables respectively. These two variables play central roles in the rest of our
analysis. Their evolutions induced by optimal learning are given by:
b Si













t+1|t = Fb Si
t|t,






Pt+1|t = FPt|tF0 + Q.
Notice that the covariance matrix evolves independently of the realization of yi
t, and is also
deterministic in this environment since Ht is deterministic. Moreover, one can show from equation
(4) that the posterior variances of αi and βi are monotonically decreasing over time, so with every
8The normality assumption is not necessary for the estimation of the parameters of the stochastic process (2), and
is not made in Guvenen (2005) to obtain the parameters in table 1.
9The notation e Xh2|h1 denotes the forecast of (alternatively, belief about) Xh2 given the information available at
time h1 if h2 >h 1 (if h2 = h1).
9new observation beliefs become more concentrated around the true values. (This is not necessarily
true for σ2
z,t which may be non-monotonic depending on the parameterization.) Finally, log income











2.4 The speed of resolution of proﬁle uncertainty
The results presented in Section 2.2 suggest that a substantial fraction of income diﬀerences over
the life-cycle is due to HIP. Consequently, the initial income risk perceived by an individual upon
entering the labor market can be substantial if the individual is suﬃciently uncertain about his
income proﬁle. However, since individuals learn their proﬁle over time, the contribution of proﬁle
uncertainty to perceived income risk later in the life-cycle depends on the speed of learning. It is
often the case with Bayesian learning that a large fraction of prior uncertainty is resolved quickly,
so it is essential to investigate this issue in the present framework.
As we quantify below, learning is very gradual in our model and its eﬀects extend throughout
the life-cycle for two reasons. The ﬁrst and main reason is that early in life the contribution of the
βit term to income is very small–most of the variation in income is due to shocks as can be seen in
Table 2–so income observations are not very informative about the growth rate of income, slowing
down learning. Second, later in life, when observations become potentially more informative, the
moderate persistence of shocks makes it diﬃcult to disentangle them from the trend component,
again slowing down learning. In the rest of this section we make these points more rigorous.
We begin by deﬁning a convenient measure of income uncertainty, the forecast variance–the
mean squared error (MSE) of the forecast–of future income:
MSEt+s|t ≡ Et
¡
yt+s − b yt+s|t
¢2 = H0
t+sPt+s|tHt+s + R, (6)





If individuals know their proﬁle with certainty (i.e., σ2
α,t = σ2
β,t =0 ), the forecast variance in
equation (6) reduces to MSEidio
t+s|t = Et
¡
zt+s − b zt+s|t
¢2+σ2
ε, where the superscript idio indicates that
the only source of risk in this case is idiosyncrati cs h o c k s .N o t i c et h a ta ni n c o m ep r o c e s sw i t hR I P
is a special case of this, so the same expression characterizes the forecast variance for such processes.
In the more general case where individuals are uncertain about their proﬁle (σ2
α,t,σ2
β,t > 0), the













10which is again obtained using equation (6). The ﬁrst term captures the risk resulting from idiosyn-
cratic shocks as before. The remaining terms in parenthesis (call it MSEnet
t+s|t)i st h enet contribution
of proﬁle uncertainty to income risk at diﬀerent horizons (given by s) as perceived by an individual
at age t. For a given t, the terms in the square bracket imply that the forecast variance (due to





, the joint updating of beliefs naturally induces a correlation between these
two components. The last term, κt+s|t, contains the corresponding covariances; it is an increasing
function of s for ﬁxed t, but does not materially aﬀect the shape of this proﬁle.
I nt h el e f tp a n e lo fﬁgure 1 we plot MSEnet
t+s|t,s=1 ,2,...,for an individual at ages t =2 5 , 35, 45,
and 55, who faces the HIP process estimated on row 2 of Table 1.10 T h et o pc u r v e( t =2 5 )s h o w st h a t
the future income risk perceived by this individual upon entering the labor market is substantial, as
can be expected from the fact that HIP accounts for a large fraction of income inequality and the
individual does not initially know his true proﬁle. As the individual gets older, the successive MSE
curves shift downward reﬂecting the resolution of proﬁle uncertainty. The main point to notice in
this graph is that the resolution of uncertainty is slow: by the time the individual is 35 years old
(the second curve from the left) only 26 percent of income risk at retirement will have been resolved.
At age 45, the forecast variance of income at retirement is still about 0.22. For comparison, at the
same age, the forecast variance at retirement that is due to idiosyncratic shocks (MSEidio
65|45)i so n l y
0.045.
The main reason for the slow learning is that individuals learn about a slope parameter, βi,
whose contribution to income is small when individuals are young, but grows monotonically with
age. Figure 2 illustrates the implications of this feature for the speed of learning. Speciﬁcally,
the vertical axes plot (log(1/σ2
x,t+1|t) − log(1/σ2
x,t|t−1)),f o rx = αi (left panel) and βi (right panel),
which can be interpreted as the percentage improvement in precision–or equivalently, the percentage
reduction in the posterior variance–at each age. In the left panel the resolution of uncertainty about
αi follows the familiar pattern: most of the learning takes place early on, and after the ﬁrst ﬁve
or so years each subsequent observation brings little fresh information about the intercept term.
In contrast, in the right panel, the information provided about βi by each additional observation
increases over time, up to about age 50. Using the terminology of signal extraction problems, the
signal-to-noise ratio increases–resulting in faster learning–as the individual gets older. In fact this
can be seen in ﬁgure 1, where the MSE curves are shifting to the right faster as the individual gets
older.
It is useful to contrast the resolution of uncertainty above to the hypothetical case where the
10To calculate the MSE we need to specify the prior covariance matrix, P1|0. We discuss the speciﬁcation of the
priors more fully below. As a simple benchmark, here we assume that the individual does not have more information






11main source of uncertainty (and hence learning) is about the level of income, αi. This comparison
is also helpful because our baseline estimate of σ2
α is around 0.02 whereas the corresponding point
estimate is 0.14 in Baker (1997) and 0.29 in Haider (2001) (see table 5). Figure 3 plots the change
in precision of beliefs about αi when σ2
α (and correspondingly the prior variance) is set to 0.20.
The two lines plot the precision when the dispersion in βi is ﬁxed at its baseline value (‘-^’), and
alternatively, when it is set to zero (‘- -’) (The two lines are almost indistinguishable in the ﬁrst
four years). In both cases, the log precision improves by 130 log points with the ﬁrst observation,
implying that the posterior variance of αi falls (by ≈ e1.3) from 0.20 to 0.054 after the ﬁrst year,
and to below 0.04 after the third year. The reason for this fast learning is clear: since βit is very
small early in life, and the stochastic shocks have much smaller variances and lower persistence than
αi, the latter stands out (i.e., the signal-to-noise ratio is high) and is detected easily. Hence, even
when there is signiﬁcantly more initial uncertainty about the level of income, it has little eﬀect on
the behavior of individuals after the ﬁrst few years, unlike the eﬀect of learning about the growth
rate of income.
A second reason for the slow learning is the moderate persistence of income shocks. We illustrate
this point in the right panel of ﬁgure 1. The bottom curve plots the net forecast variance of income
at retirement by an individual who is 35 years old (MSEnet
65|35) as a function of the persistence of
zt, normalized by its value at ρ =0 . The two curves above that are constructed similarly for t =4 5
and 55 respectively. When constructing these graphs, we adjust the innovation variance of zt as we
vary ρ to keep the unconditional variance of the AR(1) process unchanged.
One conclusion that is clear from this graph is that the speed of resolution is not a monotone
function of persistence: as ρ increases from zero up to about 0.85, the resolution of uncertainty slows
down (reﬂected in a larger forecast variance at retirement), but then speeds up again as persistence
increases further towards a unit root. In particular, learning is faster when income shocks follow a
random walk than for any other value of ρ.11 Interestingly, the values of ρ where learning is slowest
coincides with the empirical estimates of persistence reported in table 1 (although the ﬁgure also
makes clear that the resolution of uncertainty is not dramatically diﬀerent for values of ρ roughly
between 0.7 and 0.9).
The second feature apparent in the right panel of ﬁgure 1 is that the impact of persistence on
the speed of learning increases with age. For example, at age 35, increasing the persistence from
zero to 0.8 results in a 30 percent rise in MSEnet
65|35. A ta g e5 5 ,t h es a m ee x p e r i m e n tr a i s e st h e
forecast variance by 180 percent. Thus, the relatively high persistence of income shocks in the data
is important for the slow resolution of uncertainty especially later in the life-cycle.
Before concluding this section, it should be noted that slow learning is also important for another





i +( ρ − 1)zt−1 + ηt + ∆εt reduces to β
i + ηt + ∆εt in this case.
12reason: In the next section we infer the amount of prior uncertainty from the consumption-savings
behavior of individuals over the life-cycle. But if learning were quick, individuals’ behavior later in
life would contain little information about their prior uncertainty, making this setup unsuitable for
this exercise. In other words, life-cycle behavior is informative about prior uncertainty to the extent
that it is not resolved very quickly.
3 A Life-Cycle Model of Consumption and Savings
We now study the consumption-savings decision of an individual in an environment with HIP and
Bayesian learning as described in the previous section. We consider an individual who lives for T∗
y e a r sa n dw o r k sf o rt h eﬁrst T years of his life, after which he retires. Individuals do not derive
utility from leisure and hence supply labor inelastically. While working the income process is given
by equation (2). Once retired the individual receives a pension equal to a fraction, Φ, of his income
at age T. Although this speciﬁcation is admittedly much simpler than the Social Security system
in the U.S., it has the advantage of abstracting from the signiﬁcant risk-sharing inherent in that
system, and consequently from its eﬀects on the consumption-savings decision which may confound
the main focus of our analysis. Moreover, introducing a more realistic pension scheme where the
payments depend on the average earnings over the life-cycle would add an extra state variable to the
dynamic program. Thus, to avoid further complication we choose this simpler speciﬁcation. In the
robustness analysis, we examine the eﬀect of a redistributive pension system on our results. Finally,
t h e r ei sar i s k - f r e eb o n dt h a ts e l l sa tp r i c ePb (with a corresponding interest rate rf ≡ 1/Pb − 1).
Individuals can also borrow at the same interest rate up to an age-speciﬁc borrowing constraint
Wt+1, which will be speciﬁed below.
The relevant state variables for this dynamic problem are the asset level, ωt, the current income,
yt, and the last period’s forecast of the true state in the current period, b St|t−1.12 In the follow-
ing equations we include the superscript i in individual-speciﬁc variables to distinguish them from



























t+1 ≥ Wt+1 (10)
eq. (3,4)
12Although given the last two variables one can obtain both e St|t and e St+1|t using equation (3) (which means that
the individual knows the latter two vectors at the time of decision) our current choice turns out to be more convenient
for computational reasons.
13for t =1 ,...,T−1. The evolutions of the vector of beliefs and its covariance matrix are governed by
the Kalman recursions given in equations (3,4). Moreover, given that the only state variable that is
random at the time of decision is next period’s income, the expectation is taken with respect to the
conditional distribution of yi
t+1 given by equation (5). After retirement, labor income is constant
and there is no other source of uncertainty or learning, so the problem simpliﬁes signiﬁcantly:
V i
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s.t yi = Φyi
T, and eqs.(9,10)
for t = T,...T ∗, where yi does not have a t subscript to emphasize that it is constant over time, and
VT∗+1 ≡ 0.
3.1 Baseline parameterization
There is no analytical solution to the dynamic optimization problem stated in the previous section,
so we resort to numerical methods. The numerical solution is complicated by the fact that there
are ﬁve continuous state variables and four of them (excluding ωi
t)d e p e n do ne a c ho t h e ra sar e s u l t
of learning. In particular, this inter-dependence makes the solution of the value function on a
rectangular grid impractical. We develop an algorithm to tackle these issues, which could be useful
for solving similar problems. Further discussions of computational issues as well as the details of
our algorithm are provided in the computational appendix.
A model period is one year of calendar time. Individuals enter the labor market (are born) at
age 25, retire at 65 and die at age 95. The period utility function is assumed to take the CRRA
form with a relative risk aversion coeﬃcient, φ, equal to 2. The bond price, Pb is set equal to
0.96 implying an annual interest rate of 4.16 percent. We set the pension replacement rate, Φ,
equal to 0.34 in the baseline case. This value is chosen so that the pension income of the average
individual in the model is equal to 50 percent of the average of his income over the life-cycle as in
the current U.S. Social Security system. Finally, we set the time preference rate, δ, to match the
average wealth-to-income ratio in the U.S. data. Budria-Rodriguez et al. (2002) calculate this ratio
both from the Survey of Consumer Finances data set and from the National Income and Products
Account data, and obtain values between 4.14 and 5.26. However, it is not immediately clear how
to treat housing in this calculation, which is included in their calculation but not explicitly modeled
in our framework. With this in mind, we target a wealth-to-income ratio of 3.5, somewhat lower
than these reported values. Moreover, because the amount of precautionary savings depends on the
amount of uncertainty, in the next section when we make comparisons across versions of the model,
we adjust δ to keep the wealth-to-income ratio on this target.
The parameters of the stochastic component of income are taken from Table 1. Although the
14estimation of the covariance matrix pins down the variances of α and β, it does not identify their
means. The intercept term, α, is a scaling parameter and has no eﬀect on results, so it is normalized
to 1.5 for computational convenience. The mean of β is set to the mean growth of log income in the
PSID sample of Guvenen (2005): it is equal to 0.9 percent per year for the whole sample, and 0.7
percent and 1.2 percent for the group of low and high educated individuals respectively.
Determining the priors.–Empirical evidence is not particularly helpful for setting P1|0. The
diﬃculty is that the econometrician is only able to measure the population distribution of
¡
αi,βi¢
conditional on a few observable characteristics. But it is conceivable that each individual could have
some information, unavailable to the econometrician that can provide a better prediction of their
income proﬁle. Thus, rather than imposing a certain amount of prior knowledge on the individual,
we infer it from the observable actions over the life-cycle.
We begin by describing how an individual’s prior belief about βi is determined. Suppose that





u are two random variables, independent of each other, with zero mean and variances of σ2
βk and
σ2
βu. Clearly then, σ2
β = σ2
βk +σ2
βu. The key assumption is that individual i observes the realization
of βi
k, but not of βi
u (hence the subscripts indicate known and unknown, respectively). Under this
assumption, the prior mean of individual i is b β
i
1|0 = βi




β, where we deﬁne λ =1− σ2
βu/σ2
β, as the fraction of variance known by individuals.
Two polar cases deserve special attention. If λ =0 , individuals do not have any private prior
information about their income growth rate (i.e., σ2
β,0 = σ2
β). This case provides a useful benchmark
(or an upper bound) to gauge how much mileage one can get by allowing uncertainty about individual
income proﬁles. On the other hand if λ =1 , each individual observes βi completely and faces no
prior uncertainty about its value. This case provides a useful comparison to illustrate how proﬁle
uncertainty and learning alter individuals’ consumption-savings decision. Finally, as noted earlier,
the dispersion of αi is not large according to our parameterization and does not materially aﬀect
the results of the model even when it is larger. For simplicity we assume that individuals have no
private prior information about their intercept so that σ2
α,0 = σ2
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We refer to this general framework as the “proﬁle heterogeneity with uncertainty” (PHU(λ))
model, and to the special case with λ =0as the “proﬁle heterogeneity with certainty” (PHC)
model. Notice of course that in both cases the income process is the HIP model.
As for the calibration of the borrowing constraint, we have a couple of considerations in mind.
First, it is desirable to impose a loose constraint so as not to confound the eﬀects of proﬁle uncertainty
15and learning–the primary focus of this paper–with those of borrowing frictions. The loosest
constraint is implied by the condition that an individual cannot have debt at the time of death. In
this case, in any given period an individual can borrow up to the point where he can still pay back
all of his debt even if he happens to face the lowest possible income realization for the rest of his
life. In our framework, this requirement implies that each individual face a diﬀerent natural limit,
unlike in a standard life-cycle model with ex-ante identical individuals. However, in this case the
constraints themselves contain information about an individual’s proﬁle which would then need to
be optimally incorporated into beliefs. This would further complicate the model probably without
providing much additional insight. Instead, we allow all individuals to borrow up to a common
borrowing limit determined as the natural limit of an individual based on public prior information
(that is, σ2
β,0 = σ2
β). In other words, this is the natural limit that credit institutions would enforce
on individuals when only time-0 public information is available. Notice that since yt is log-normally
distributed, the lowest income realization can be arbitrarily close to zero, so we truncate the Normal
distribution of income at 2.5 standard deviations to provide a proper lower bound. As we discuss
further below in our baseline speciﬁcation this constraint is almost never binding.
To simulate the model we draw 1000 (α,β) combinations (one for each type of individual) from a
bivariate Normal distribution whose covariance matrix is taken from row 2 of Table 1 and simulate
100 paths for each type. The reported statistics are averages over these simulated data.
4 Quantitative Results
In this section, we investigate if the consumption behavior implied by the HIP model combined with
Bayesian learning about income proﬁles is consistent with empirical facts, and especially with certain
ﬁndings that have commonly been interpreted as evidence supporting the RIP model (Deaton and
Paxson (1994), Carroll and Summers (1991)).
4.1 The age-inequality proﬁle of consumption
Deaton and Paxson (1994) document the striking rise in within-cohort consumption inequality (along
with income inequality) over time. In particular, the cross-sectional variance of log consumption (per
adult equivalent) increases by about 25 log points in the U.S. data–roughly corresponding to the
doubling of inequality–over a cohort’s life-cycle. For completeness, we replicate their ﬁnding as
closely as possible.13 T h eb r o k e nl i n ei nﬁgure 4 displays the resulting age-inequality proﬁle, which
13We use data on consumption expenditures from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE), obtained from Krueger
and Perri (2004). We choose our consumption measure and sample period following Deaton and Paxson (1994) to
make comparison easier. Thus, consumption refers to household non-durable expenditures during the last quarter. The
sample period is 1980-90, but unlike these authors who concentrate on urban households, we include all households
into our sample, which requires us to exclude the 1982-83 period since data on rural households is not available during
16is very similar to the one presented by Deaton and Paxson.
While the mere existence of fanning-out in the consumption distribution is not surprising–as
it is implied for example by the permanent income theory–the large magnitude of the increase
is. Deaton and Paxson discuss several potential explanations and ﬁnd the existence of persistent
(uninsurable) idiosyncratic shocks to be the most promising candidate. Recently, Storesletten et al.
(2003) have shown that a life-cycle model can quantitatively match the rise in inequality observed
in the data if income shocks are extremely persistent.
We now examine the evolution of within-cohort consumption inequality in the PHU(λ) model.
To provide a benchmark, we begin with the case where individuals have no private prior information
about βi (that is, λ =0 ) . The (top) solid line in Figure 4 plots the age-inequality proﬁle in this case,
which shows a substantial rise in consumption inequality over the life-cycle–roughly 40 log points,
compared to 25 log points in the U.S. data.14 Thus, if anything, the model generates too much rise
in inequality unless individuals have more prior information than assumed in this case.
This observation suggests that one way to measure λ is to choose it to generate the same increase
in consumption inequality over the life-cycle observed in the data.15 This procedure yields λ∗ =0 .46.
The interpretation of this estimate is that 46 percent of the variability in income growth rates is
forecastable by individuals at the time they enter the labor market. Moreover, although λ is chosen
to match the total rise in inequality, the overall shape of the resulting age-inequality proﬁle provides
an i c eﬁt to its empirical counterpart. We return to this point in the next section.
There are several issues related to the interpretation of the estimate of λ. First, recall that in
equation (2) we did not include an education dummy into the common life-cycle proﬁle g,s oa n y
variation in income growth rates between education groups is also captured in σ2
β. As a result λ
also contains any forecastability in βi that is due to diﬀerences in education level. It is possible
to quantify the amount of forecastability due to education, and the amount due to other (possibly
unobservable) variables known to the individual. To this end, we ﬁrst solve the consumption-savings
problem for each education group separately under the assumption that individuals know the average
value of βi and its dispersion for their education group, but are not able to predict their own βi
this time. We use Census equivalence scale to convert household consumption into per-adult-equivalent units to make
comparable to income data from PSID which is used to estimated the income processes in table 1. See Krueger and
Perri (2004) for further details of sample selection and variable construction.
The diﬀerences in our data construction from Deaton and Paxson (1994) do not seem to make a noticeable diﬀerence
for the age-inequality proﬁle we obtain, which is very similar to theirs. To obtain the graph in ﬁgure 4, we follow
Deaton and Paxson and regress raw variances for each age-year cell on a set of age and cohort dummies and report the
coeﬃcients on the age dummies. To reduce the number of cohort dummies estimated, we group individuals between
25 and 29 as the ﬁrst cohort, between 30 to 34 as the second cohort and so on. The age dummies are scaled so that
the average inequality matches that in the sample.
14Only a small fraction of this fanning-out is directly attributable to idiosyncratic shocks: if we eliminate proﬁle
heterogeneity (and consequently learning) from this model, the rise in inequality would only be 8 log points.
15When we calibrate the parameters of diﬀerent education groups separately as we do below, we keep δ identical
across these groups and adjust them by the same amount to keep the aggregate wealth-to-income ratio unchanged.
17beyond this information. In addition, individuals in each education group are now assumed to face
the idiosyncratic shock process corresponding to their group as reported on rows 4 and 6 of Table 1.
The dashed line in ﬁgure 4 plots the result. Now inequality rises by 32 log points, compared
to 40 log points when individuals do not condition on education. To translate this diﬀerence into
the fraction of forecastability due to education information, we choose λ in the benchmark model
above to generate an increase in inequality of 32 log points, which yields λ∗ =0 .27. The diﬀerence
between the two estimates of λ (0.46 − 0.27 = 0.19) measures the fraction of forecastability due to
information other than education available to the individual.
Redistributive Social Security.–The U.S. retirement pension system features signiﬁcant redis-
tribution, thereby providing risk-sharing within each cohort. The extent of risk-sharing in turn
is critical for the rise in consumption inequality over the life-cycle. For example, with complete
risk-sharing in the baseline model the age-inequality proﬁle would be ﬂat–consumption inequality
would be constant over the life-cycle–regardless of the amount of prior uncertainty about income
proﬁles. Therefore our estimate of λ partly depends on the assumed pension system. To examine
the sensitivity of the previous estimate, we next introduce a redistributive pension system which
captures the salient features of the U.S. Social Security system as described in Storesletten et al.
(2003). Speciﬁcally, the retirement replacement rate is a concave function of an individual’s income
at age T given by:
Φ(YT)=0 .715 ×
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0.9YT for YT < 0.3Y T
0.27 + 0.32YT for YT ∈ (0.3Y T,2Y T]
0.81 + 0.15YT for YT ∈ (2Y T,4.1Y T]
1.1 for YT > 4.1Y T
where Y T is the average income at age T.16
With this modiﬁcation to the pension system, consumption inequality would rise by 22 log
points over the life-cycle, if λ was kept at its baseline estimate of 0.46 (and δ was re-set to 0.957
to keep the wealth-to-income ratio unchanged). As predicted, the concave pension function reduces
the diﬀerences in life-time income compared to the baseline model thereby reducing consumption
inequality along with it. To match the increase of 0.25 log points as in the data, the value of λ
must be 0.37. The solid line in Figure 5 plots the age-inequality proﬁle along with the one from the
baseline model for comparison. With this re-calibrated value of λ, the shape of the proﬁle changes
16There is one diﬀerence between this speciﬁcation and the one in Storesletten et al. (2002): Φ h e r ei saf u n c t i o n
of YT instead of the average income over an individual’s life-cycle (which would require us to track one more state
variable). However, because income shocks are not very persistent in our model, YT is highly correlated with an
individual’s average income (correlation: 0.89), so the diﬀerence may not be crucial. Moreover, because YT is 40
percent higher than average income over the life-cycle, we need to multiply our pension schedule by 1/1.40 ≈ 0.715 to
match the average level of beneﬁts in their speciﬁcation.
18little and the only noticeable change happens after age 55.
We conclude from these results that a model with HIP generates substantial rise in consumption
inequality–in fact, more than what is observed in the U.S. data–which suggests that some part of
the heterogeneity in income growth rates is known by individuals by the time they enter the labor
market. As our benchmark ﬁgure, we take the estimate from the model with Social Security, λ∗ =
0.37.
4.2 The non-concavity of the age-inequality proﬁle of consumption
A second feature of the age-inequality proﬁle emphasized by Deaton and Paxson is its non-concave
shape. Examining consumption data from three countries–U.S., U.K., and Taiwan–these authors
ﬁnd that the age-inequality proﬁle increases approximately linearly in the former and is convex in
the latter two countries. The same pattern also holds true in the PHU(λ) model with a slightly
convex rise early on, followed by a linear segment, which tapers oﬀ after age 55. Deaton and Paxson
stress this non-concavity because it seems hard to be reconciled with the existence of persistent
shocks. Speciﬁcally, using the certainty equivalent version of the permanent income model they show
that the inequality proﬁle will be concave if the income process has a large persistent component.
Storesletten et al. (2003) later study a more general model with CRRA utility and a rich set of
realistic features and ﬁnd concavity to be a robust feature of the life-cycle model with persistent
shocks. For completeness, the dashed line in ﬁgure 5 plots the age-inequality proﬁle from the baseline
model studied by these authors where this concavity can be seen.
The eﬀect of Bayesian learning on the shape of the age-inequality proﬁle mainly depends on
whether learning is about the intercept or the slope of the income proﬁle. The main intuition can be
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where Yt+s ≡ exp(yt+s) is the level of income, γ =1 /
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annuitization factor. To simplify the problem further, assume that income (instead of log income)
is a linear function of experience with i.i.d. innovations: Y i
t = αi + βit + εi
t.17
17These assumptions are rather innocuous in this context. First, the exponential function is increasing and convex,
so the Log-normal speciﬁcation for income in the baseline model will only reinforce the mechanism described here.
In fact, we can obtain a closed-form solution for the consumption decision for the model described in this section
(including when income is speciﬁed as Log-normal). This explicit solution allows one to easily verify this assertion as
well as showing that the convexity result does not depend on the existence of borrowing constraints. These results
are available upon request. Second, even though income shocks are not i.i.d in our model, their persistence is small
enough that they do not create strong enough concavity to overturn this conclusion.
19First, consider the case where individuals learn about their intercept αi, but know their βi exactly.
It can easily be shown that (11) reduces to ∆ct = b αt|t −b αt−1|t−1. Because the right hand side of this
expression is shrinking with age due to learning, the age-inequality proﬁle will be unambiguously
concave.
Now consider the opposite: individuals learn about βi, but know αi. When an individual up-
dates his beliefs in period t, the revision in expected future income is: (Et − Et−1)Yt+s =( b βt|t −
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¸³
b βt|t − b βt−1|t−1
´
. (12)
For a range of plausible values for rf and T, the term in the square bracket is an approximately
linear (and slightly convex) increasing function of t. Moreover, recall–from the graph in the right
panel of ﬁgure 2–that the speed of learning about βi increases over time so the absolute value of
(b βt|t −b βt−1|t−1) is getting larger on average up to about age 50.18 As a result, consumption changes
will be larger in absolute value as a cohort gets older implying a convex shape for the age-inequality
proﬁle.
Although in the PHU(λ) model individuals learn about both the intercept and the slope of their
income proﬁle, learning about αi happens very quickly (even when the prior variance is much larger
than what is assumed in the baseline calibration), and hence has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the shape.
Instead, the shape is mainly determined by learning about βi, which gives it the non-concave form.
4.3 The co-movement of consumption and income over the life-cycle
A second well-documented empirical ﬁnding is that consumption tracks income over the life-cycle:
it ﬁrst rises and then falls with income (Carroll and Summers (1991)). It is possible to generate this
behavior in a life-cycle model by assuming idiosyncratic shocks with high persistence, and a utility
function that induces precautionary savings behavior (such as CRRA.) In this case, individuals
reduce their consumption early in life to build a buﬀer stock wealth for self-insurance. As they
get older, persistent shocks have fewer periods left to aﬀect income, eﬀectively resulting in less
uncertainty. In response, individuals reduce their savings rate, allowing consumption to rise along
with income, generating the empirical co-movement (Carroll (1992), Attanasio et al. (1999).
However, another ﬁnding documented by Carroll and Summers poses a challenge to this basic
story. These authors found that consumption also tracks income within education groups: that is,
college-educated individuals not only have steeper income proﬁles, but also have steeper consumption
proﬁles than high-school educated individuals. For example, Krueger and Fernandez-Villaverde
18Although, more precisely ﬁgure 2 shows that the change in the logarithm of the belief about β
i is increasing.over
time, a similar plot also holds true for the level of beliefs.
20(2004) show that over the life-cycle consumption (in per-adult equivalent units) rises by about
50 percent for the former group and by about 10 percent for the latter. For a model based on
precautionary savings alone to explain this observation, it would require the former group to face
income shocks that are either more persistent or more volatile than the latter group,19 neither of
which we seem to ﬁnd in the data. For example, in rows 3 and 5 of table 1 which display the estimates
from the RIP model, there is little diﬀerence between the idiosyncratic shock process faced by each
group. To examine the consumption proﬁles that would be implied by these income processes, we
solve the life-cycle model described in Section 3 for each education group separately. For each group
we use the income process with RIP from rows 3 and 5 of Table 1. Figure 6 displays the results.
The left panel plots the average income proﬁles, and as expected, it is steeper for college-educated
individuals. However, the average consumption proﬁle of this group (right panel) is not noticeably
steeper than that of the high school-educated group: it rises by 38 percent over the life-cycle for the
former group compared to 36 percent for the latter.
Next we solve the PHU(λ) model for each education group. As can be seen in rows 4 and 6 of
table 1, while the estimates of the idiosyncratic shock processes for each group remain similar to each
other when HIP is introduced, a major diﬀerence arises in the dispersion of βi: college graduates
face a much wider dispersion of income growth rates (σ2
β =0 .00049) than lower educated individuals
(σ2
β =0 .00020). To translate these numbers into the amount of prior uncertainty about βi, we
assume that λ is equal to 0.19 for both groups, which is the value we obtained in Section 4.1 after
conditioning on education information.20 Now the average consumption proﬁl e( r i g h tp a n e lo fF i g u r e
7) rises twice as much (by 39 percent) for the college-educated compared to the high school-educated
(by 19 percent). More prior uncertainty about income proﬁles generates more precautionary savings
for the former group resulting in steeper rise in consumption.
Note ﬁnally that consumption would also track income (even without uncertainty about income
proﬁles) if there were frequently binding borrowing constraints. In the presence of HIP, however,
constrained individuals would typically be thosew i t hh i g hi n c o m eg r o w t hr a t e s . I n d e e d ,i nt h e
PHC model (λ =1 ) , the average consumption of constrained individuals is higher throughout the
life-cycle and is almost double that of unconstrained ones at retirement. This comparison also shows
that proﬁle uncertainty should be an integral part of a model with HIP, which otherwise (with a
very high λ) yields counterfactual implications.
19Clearly this is because without income shocks both groups should have the same slope of the income proﬁles
unless they diﬀer systematically in some other respect. Attanasio et. al (1999) suggested that systematic diﬀerences in
demographics and preferences may generate the observed diﬀerences between education groups. For example, if more
highly educated individuals are more patient and tend to have larger families they would optimally choose steeper
consumption proﬁl e sc o m p a r e dt oh i g hs c h o o lg r a d u a t e s .
20It is not obvious however that λ should be the same for both groups. It seems possible to make a case for more or
less forecastability of income growth prospects for each education group, and these issues deserve further attention in
future work.
214.4 The eﬀect of proﬁle uncertainty on life-cycle savings
The ﬂip side of the consumption choice that we have focused upon so far is the savings decision,
and therefore, the wealth distribution also contains useful information that can shed light on the
nature of income risk faced by individuals. In particular, we focus on the relationship between an
individual’s wealth holdings and his labor income, which are positively correlated in the U.S. data.21
This positive correlation has implications for whether or not the heterogeneity in income growth rates
also represent uncertainty from the individuals’ point of view. For example, in a purely deterministic
w o r l d( a n da s s u m i n gαi ≡ 0 for simplicity), individuals with fast income growth will borrow more
(or save less) than those with slower income growth in order to smooth consumption over the life-
cycle. Consequently, in this simple model wealth holdings and income will be perfectly negatively
correlated. This negative relationship typically holds true even with sizeable income uncertainty,
and is present even when one only allows for a limited amount of heterogeneity in income proﬁles.
For example, when calibrating life-cycle models, researchers often allow βi to vary between education
groups, but restrict it to be the same within each group (among others, Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes
(1994), Campbell et al. (2001), Davis, Kubler and Willen (2003)), resulting in the counterfactual
implication that wealth holdings fall with education level. More generally, such models will typically
predict that the income-rich will be the wealth-poor, inconsistent with empirical evidence.
T u r n i n gt ot h eP H Cm o d e l( i . e . ,λ =1 ), the correlation between an individual’s wealth, ωi
t, and
the slope of this proﬁle, βi, starts from −0.88 at age 25, and while it gradually increases over time,
it remains negative until age 60, with an average value of −0.58 (Table 4). As before, individuals
with high income growth rates have low wealth holdings in this model as well. Moreover, the
correlation of wealth with the level of the income proﬁle, αi +βit, is also negative, averaging −0.40
over the life-cycle. In contrast, if one allows for uncertainty about income growth rates as in the
baseline PHU(λ =0 .37) model, the average correlation of ωi
t with βi becomes positive (0.26), and
the correlation with the level of income proﬁle is 0.39.
These results reiterate the conclusion of the previous section that a life-cycle model with HIP
yields counterfactual implications unless uncertainty about these proﬁles is also taken into account.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have studied the consumption-savings behavior when the labor income process is
the HIP model, and individuals learn about their proﬁle in a Bayesian fashion. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is
that proﬁle uncertainty is resolved very gradually, mainly due to learning about the growth rate of
income, which starts slow and becomes faster over time. A second reason is the moderate persistence
21Budria-Rodriguez et al. (2002) calculate this correlation to be 0.47 using SCF data. Hurst et al. (1998) provide
regression evidence where income enters as a signiﬁcant determinant of wealth with a very high t-statistic.
22of income shocks which results in slower learning compared to both i.i.d shocks as well as random
walk shocks. Because of slow learning consumption behavior over the life-cycle is informative about
initial uncertainty which we used to estimate the prior information individuals have about their
income growth rate.
The resulting life-cycle model displays plausible behavior and also shows how the nature of
i n c o m er i s ki m p l i e db yt h eH I Pm o d e l( c o m b i n e dw i t hB a y e s i a nl e a r n i n g )i sd i ﬀerent from that
implied by the RIP model. For example, the HIP model generates steeper consumption proﬁles
for college-educated individuals if the larger dispersion of income growth rates translate into higher
initial uncertainty and hence more precautionary savings for the former group. Instead, in the RIP
model one needs to also assume systematic diﬀerences across education groups in preferences and
demographics to explain these facts. Moreover, the HIP model generates an age-inequality proﬁle
of consumption that is slightly convex, as documented by Deaton and Paxson (1994), as opposed to
the concave shape resulting in a life-cycle model with a RIP process.
Another conclusion that we draw from this analysis is that if individuals face the HIP process
without uncertainty about income growth rates, the resulting consumption behavior is counter-
factual: an individual’s income and wealth becomes negatively correlated; borrowing constrained
individuals are the income-rich and as a result, the average consumption of constrained individuals
is twice that of unconstrained individuals.
In addition, uncertainty about the level of income (αi), even when it is very large, does not
play a signiﬁcant role in the consumption-savings behavior, because it is resolved very quickly.
Thus in future applications of this framework it seems reasonable to eliminate the heterogeneity
(or uncertainty) in αi and reduce the number of state variables by one, which will bring signiﬁcant
computational gain.
An important question that has not been addressed in this paper concerns the origins of the
heterogeneity in income growth rates. One plausible framework that we suggested earlier is the
human capital model (Ben-Porath 1967) with heterogeneity in the ability to accumulate human
capital. One diﬀerence however is that in the basic human capital model individuals are assumed to
know their ability (and hence income growth) in contrast to our assumption of learning about the
growth rate. Fortunately, it is possible to obtain an analytical solution to the Ben-Porath model
with Bayesian learning abouta b i l i t yi nt h ep r e s e n c eo fi.i.d shocks (these results are available upon
request). The main ﬁnding from this exercise is that learning mainly aﬀects the timing of the
dispersion in income growth rates: individuals invest in similar rates early on because they believe
they have similar ability levels. As a result, heterogeneity in income growth is small early in the
life-cycle, because it is only driven by ability diﬀerences. Over time, as individuals ﬁnd out more
about their true ability, they also adjust their investment levels which increases the dispersion of
income growth rates further. In future research we intend to introduce a richer shock process, and
23study the properties of consumption decision in this model.
An appealing feature of the present framework with slow learning is that it could provide a
setup for estimating λ from a broader set of economic actions of individuals over the life-cycle. For
example, the discussion of equation 12 shows that the dynamic response of consumption to income
shocks contains useful information about the amount of proﬁle uncertainty. Similarly, one could
augment the current model with other economic decisions, such as labor supply and/or portfolio
choice, to bring a wide range of evidence to bear on the estimation of λ. We intend to pursue these
issues in future research.
24A Appendix: Estimates of the HIP model in the Literature
Table 5 presents the estimates of the HIP model from the U.S. data in the previous literature. As can
be seen here, the estimates of σ2
β range from 0.00018 in Lillard and Weiss (1979) to 0.00041 in Haider
(2001). The former paper estimates a separate income process for each ﬁnely deﬁned occupation category
(such as chemists, psychologists, etc.), which could be partly responsible for the smaller estimate of proﬁle
heterogeneity. However, all the estimates of σ2
β are statistically signiﬁcant, and the latter two papers point
estimates are rather close to each other. Baker also report estimates as high as 0.00082; his lowest estimate
is 0.00031. Second, the persistence parameter in these studies are around 0.6 to 0.7, indicating signiﬁcantly
lower persistence than a unit root.
B Appendix: Computational Algorithm
This appendix describes the algorithm used to solve the consumption-savings problem described in Section 3.
The ﬁrst point to observe is that since the value function does not explicitly depend on the type of individual
we need to solve for only one value function for all individuals. The true type only determines the probability




)w h i c ht h e n
determines the probability distribution of the belief vector, b Si
t|t−1, for a given agent. In turn, this determines
which region of the state space will be most visited for a given individual. To solve the model for a large
number of types we need to get a good approximation of the value function for the union of the supports for
these diﬀerent types, which is the challenging part.
We ﬁrst describe the algorithm for λ =0so that all individuals begin life with the same prior information.
A slight modiﬁcation then will solve the model for diﬀerent λ values. The critical part of the algorithm is
the construction of a convenient grid over which the dynamic problem is solved. Once this is accomplished,
solving the model is straightforward.
Step 0: Grid construction






from a Normal distribution with second moments (σ2
α,σ2
β,σαβ)
reported in Table 1. In the baseline case, we chose I = 1000




t ,t =1 ,..,T; j =1 ,..,J
o
using equation (2) to obtain an
empirical approximation to the distribution of e yi
t. We chose J = 100.
3. For each of the N ≡ I ×J income paths, use equation (3) to obtain a sequence of b S
ij
t|t−1 for t =1 ,..,T.










t|t−1 and b zt|t−1 directions and
taking the Cartesian product of these intervals, we directly choose points in this 3-dimensional space as
follows. We divide the space [b αmin, b αmax]×[b βmin,b βmax]×[b zmin,b zmax] (with appropriately chosen lower
and upper bounds) into cubes by taking 21 points in each direction (and get 20 × 20 × 20 cubes). For
every t, if there are any points (among the 100,000 realizations of b S
ij
t|t−1)t h a tf a l li n t oac u b e ,w ea s s i g n
a grid point to the center of that cube (and eliminate all empty cubes). This procedure picks a subset
of the 3-dimensional space that contains state points that have a non-negligible probability of being
realized when we simulate the model. (It is important to emphasize that we do not do this for eﬃciency
reasons. Our experience is that attempts at solving for the value function over a Cartesian state spaces
runs into a number of diﬃculties and this is one approach we found to work). We enumerate these
triplets {e S
q
t =( b α,b β,b z)q,q=1 ,..,Qt},w h e r eQt is the total number of non-empty cubes and hence grid
points at age t (From this point on, we drop the reference to t and describe the grid construction for a
given age. The same procedure is repeated for each t.)
4. The grid for e yij needs to be consistent with the probability distribution implied by the type of individual,




is not a state variable it is
22For example, if we attempt to solve the dynamic problem with a h y
h
it that is much larger than what would be
25not possible to literally have the grid for e yij depend on the type. Instead then, we choose a diﬀerent





max] where the bounds are deﬁned
as:e x p ( He Sq ±3σ(e yq)); He Sq is the mean income and σ(e yq) is the standard deviation given in equation
(5). In other words, these bounds deﬁne a three standard deviation conﬁdence interval for income
through equation (5) given beliefs e Sq. We take 8 equally spaced points for each income grid. (Using 20
points did not make a noticeable diﬀerence in results.) We repeat the same steps for each t.
5. Unlike the other 4 state variables, wealth does not aﬀect and is not aﬀected by the learning process.
T h u s ,w et a k eaﬁxed wealth grid–that is, one that does not depend on beliefs or income–with 12
points, more densely spaced near the borrowing constraint, (Using 20 points did not make a noticeable
diﬀerence in results.) At a given age, the ﬁnal grid is the Cartesian product of this wealth grid and the
(4-dimensional) grid (y
q
grid, e Sq). So the problem is solved on (12×8×Qt) grid points, where Qt ranges
from 240 to 1100 over the life-cycle and averages 830.
Step 1: Solving the Dynamic Problem
1. The dynamic problem is solved using the Bellman equation approach. We solve the problem for each
point on the random grid at age t.
2. The non-Cartesian structure of the state space rules out a number of multi-dimensional interpolation
methods such as splines, Chebyshev polynomials that typically require Cartesian grids in more than
one dimension. Instead, we approximate the value function with a combination of polynomial functions
(up to the 4th power) and other functions (such as logs and fractional powers) of the state variables
including various interaction terms between them (a total of 162 terms used in the baseline model).
After solving the Bellman equation at age t, we regress the values of the value function at the grid
points on these functions of the state variables. These coeﬃcients are then used for the interpolations
necessary to evaluate the expectation when solving the period t − 1 problem.
3. After the model is solved, we simulate the decision rules for a large number of individuals. For simplicity
we used the same I types drawn above and the N simulated income paths to obtain consumption-savings
paths.





, the Bayesian updating results in next period’s beliefs that are substantially away
from next period’s grid for h S
q
t+1, because the latter is constructed based on income realizations that are going to be
observed in the actual solution. As a result, one needs to extrapolate next period’s value function which often yields
extremely inaccurate results (despite the fact that these far-oﬀ points have low probability). Considering a h y
h
it that is
much smaller than what is consistent with the type, results in similar problems as well as creating further problems
with infeasible borrowing constraints.
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29Table 1: Parameter estimates of the labor income process from Guvenen (2005)





(1) A RIP .988 .058 –– .015 .061
(.024) (.011) (.007) (.010)
(2) A HIP .821 .022 .00038 −.0020 .029 .047
(.030) (.074) (.00008) (.0032) (.008) (.007)
(3) C RIP .979 .031 –– .0099 .047
(.055) (.021) (.013) (.020)
(4) C HIP .805 .023 .00049 −.0024 .025 .032
(.061) (.112) (.00014) (.0039) (.015) (.017)
(5) H RIP .972 .053 –– .011 .052
(.023) (.015) (.007) (.008)
(6) H HIP .829 .038 .00020 −.0007 .022 .034
(.029) (.081) (.00009) (.0012) (.008) (.007)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. In the second column, A = all individuals, C = college-educated group,
a n dH=h i g hs c h o o le d u c a t e dg r o u p .T i m ee ﬀects in the variances of persistent and transitory shocks are included
in the estimation in all rows, but are not reported to save space. The reported variances are averages over the
sample period. These parameter estimates are taken from Guvenen (2005)
Table 2: Decomposing Within-Cohort Income Inequality






η 2σαβt + σ2
βt2 (3)
(1)+(2)+(3)
30 .069 .082 .005 .03
35 .069 .088 .030 .16
45 .069 .089 .135 .46
55 .069 .089 .315 .67
65 .069 .089 .568 .79
30Table 3: Baseline Parameterization
Annual model
Parameter Value
δ Time discount rate∗ 0.962
Pf Price of risk-free bond 0.96
φ Relative risk aversion 2
β Avg. inc. growth for all households 0.009
β
C
Avg. inc. growth for college educ. 0.012
β
H
Avg. inc. growth for high school educ. 0.007
T Retirement age 65
T∗ Age of death 95
Φ Replacement rate 0.34
P1|0 The variance of prior beliefs See text
Note: The parameters of the income process are taken from corresponding rows of Table 1.
∗The time discount
rate is adjusted in each experiment to generate a wealth-to-income ratio of 3.5. The value reported in the table is
for baseline PHU model with λ =0 . See text for details
Table 4: Income-Wealth Correlation Over the Life-Cycle
The average correlation of wealth with:
βi αi + βit
PHC (λ =1 .00) −0.58 −0.40
PHU (λ =0 .37) 0.26 0.39
Table 5: Alternative Estimates of the HIP Model
Paper ρσ 2
α σ2
β σαβ Stochastic Time eﬀects
Process in variances?
Lillard and .707 .0305 .00018 .00076 AR(1) +i.i.d No
Weiss (1979) (.073) (.0015) (.00004) (.0001)
Baker (1997) .674 .139 .00039 −.004 ARMA(1,2) Ye s
(.050) (.069) (.00013) (.003)
Haider (2001) .639 .295 .00041 −.00827 ARMA(1,1) Ye s
(.077) (.137) (.00012) (.0036)
Notes: Lillard and Weiss’s data is biannual from the National Science Foundation’s Register of Scientiﬁca n d
Technical Personnel covering 1960-70. The reported estimates are from table 7 of their paper, which has the most
similar speciﬁcation to ours. Baker uses PSID data 1967-86, and this result is from Table 4, row 6, which has the
best overall ﬁt. Haider’s data is also from PSID covering 1967-1992, and the results are from table 4.
31Figure 1: The Speed of Resolution of Income Uncertainty Through Bayesian Learning
about Profiles







































t = 55 Top curve: MSE
t+s|t=25, s=1, 2, ...
Others are for t = 35,  45 and 55
32Figure 2: The Change in the Precision of Beliefs about α and β

























































































Figure 3: The Change in the Precision of Beliefs about α When σ2
α,0 is Set to 10 times
Its Baseline Value
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33Figure 4: The age-inequality Profile of consumption in the U.S. data and in the PHU
model























































Baseline PHU model (no−information prior)
PHU model (Prior conditioned on education)
PHU model (Prior chosen to match rise in inequality)
Figure 5: The Age-Inequality Profile of Consumption: Comparisons
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60

















































PHU model: Redistributive pension system
Life−cycle model: Homogenous Profiles
and Permanent shocks                 
PHU model: Baseline retirement system
34Figure 6: The average income and consumption profiles by education groups in a
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